Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles

NAP. The worldwide expansion of nuclear energy has been accompanied by concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. If sited in states that do not possess nuclear weapons technology, some civilian nuclear technologies could provide a route for states or other organizations to acquire nuclear weapons. Metrics for assessing the resistance of a nuclear technology to diversion for non-peaceful uses-proliferation resistance-have been developed, but at present there is no clear consensus on whether and how these metrics are useful to policy decision makers. 

In 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy asked the National Academies to convene a public workshop addressing the capability of current and potential methodologies for assessing host state proliferation risk and resistance to meet the needs of decision makers. Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles is a summary of presentations and discussions that transpired at the workshop-held on August 1-2, 2011-prepared by a designated rapporteur following the workshop. It does not provide findings and recommendations or represent a consensus reached by the symposium participants or the workshop planning committee. However, several themes emerged through the workshop: nonproliferation and new technologies, separate policy and technical cultures, value of proliferation resistance analysis, usefulness of social science approaches. 

The workshop was organized as part of a larger project undertaken by the NRC, the next phase of which (following the workshop) will be a consensus study on improving the assessment of proliferation risks associated with nuclear fuel cycles. This study will culminate in a report prepared by a committee of experts with expertise in risk assessment and communication, proliferation metrics and research, nuclear fuel cycle facility design and engineering, international nuclear nonproliferation and national security policy, and nuclear weapons design. This report is planned for completion in the spring of 2013.

Sarah C. Case, Rapporteur; National Research Council

Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles x

Source of Iodine-131 in Europe Identified

IAEA. Press Release 2011/27 17 November 2011. The IAEA has received information from the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) that the source of the iodine-131 (I-131) detected in Europe was most probably a release to the atmosphere from the Institute of Isotopes Ltd., Budapest. The Institute of Isotopes Ltd. produces radioisotopes for healthcare, research and industrial applications. According to the HAEA, the release occurred from September 8 to November 16, 2011. The cause of the release is under investigation.

As previously mentioned, the levels of I-131 that have been detected in Europe are extremely low. There is no health concern to the population. If any member of the public were to breathe iodine for a whole year at the levels measured in European countries, then they would receive a dose in the range of 0.01 microsieverts for the year. To put this into perspective, the average annual background is 2400 microsieverts per year.

The IAEA was first notified of the presence of trace levels of I-131 by authorities from the Czech Republic on 11 November. Since this notification, the IAEA contacted several member states throughout the region to determine the cause and origin. The IAEA also worked with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to conduct air dispersion modelling, as part of efforts to determine the source. 

Upton Welcomes GAO Recommendations for Enhanced Planning and Collaboration in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Research & Development

November 16, 2011. WASHINGTON, DC– Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI) today welcomed recommendations in a new GAO report regarding the Department of Energy’s nuclear fuel cycle research and development efforts. Upton requested the report with Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) and former Congressman Rick Boucher (D-VA). GAO’s review found that DOE should enhance its planning and its collaboration with industry and other countries in pursing such research and development.

Upton made the following statement on the report’s recommendations:

“Nuclear energy is a critical part of the nation’s energy supply portfolio. I support the report’s recommendations to enhance DOE’s current research and planning efforts for the development of nuclear fuel cycle and associated technologies. Increased collaboration with industry and other countries will help address technical challenges, assist the development of advanced technologies, and promote the expanded use of nuclear power necessary to meet our nation’s growing energy demands.”

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options Doe.Needs to Enhance Planning for Technology Assessment and Collaboration with Industry and Other Countries