Showing posts with label macroeconomic. Show all posts
Showing posts with label macroeconomic. Show all posts

Thursday, January 19, 2012

Can International Macroeconomic Models Explain Low-Frequency Movements of Real Exchange Rates?


Real exchange rates exhibit important low-frequency fluctuations. This makes the analysis of real exchange rates at all frequencies a more sound exercise than the typical business cycle one, which compares actual and simulated data after the Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied to both. A simple two-country, two-good model, as described in Heathcote and Perri (2002), can explain the volatility of the real exchange rate when all frequencies are studied. The puzzle is that the model generates too much persistence of the real exchange rate instead of too little, as the business cycle analysis asserts. Finally, we show that the introduction of adjustment costs in production and in portfolio holdings allows us to reconcile theory and this feature of the data.

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that a baseline international real business cycle (IRBC) two-country, two-good model, such as the one described in Heath-cote and Perri (2002), cannot generate either enough volatility or enough persistence in the real exchange rate (RER) when compared to the data. When the object of interest is RER ‡uctuations at all frequencies, instead of business cycle (BC) frequencies only, this model can explain the standard deviation of the U.S. dollar RER. However, the model implies a higher persistence of the RER than in the data.

We advocate that analyzing RER ‡uctuations at all frequencies is a more compelling exercise than just studying the BC ones. Spectral analysis shows that most of the variance of the RER in the data can be assigned to low-frequency movements (about 70 percent), while movements at BC frequencies account for only a small share of the RER ‡uctuations (just 25 percent). The baseline IRBC model accounts for the area below the spectrum of the RER, i.e., its standard deviation, but not for its shape, since it places a larger share of ‡uctuations of the RER in low-frequency movements than in the data. We call this shortcoming of the model the “excess persistence of RER”puzle. We show that extending the model to consider adjustment costs in the composition of domestic and imported intermediate input and portfolio adjustment costs helps to solve this puzzle (i.e., replicating the shape of the spectrum) while still explaining the standard deviation of the RER (i.e., the area below the spectrum).

Since the seminal works of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) and Baxter and Crucini (1995), the IRBC literature has been preoccupied with explaining the international transmission of shocks, the cyclical comovement of variables across countries, and the behavior of international relative prices. As in the real business cycle (RBC) literature, the IRBC literature mainly concentrates on explaining the BC ‡uctuations of the data. The success of the model is measured by its ability to reproduce selected second moments of Hodrick-Prescott (HP) …ltered data, which removes trends and low-frequency movements. Other papers use instead the band-pass …lter, as described in Baxter and King (1999) or Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). The researcher compares the second moments of actual data with those implied by arti…cial data generated by the model after the same detrending procedure has been applied to both. One of the most relevant facts in the HP-…ltered data is that international relative prices are more volatile than output and highly persistent. IRBC models with reasonable calibrations have a hard time reproducing these features. In earlier work Backus, Kehoe and Kydland

(1994) and Stockman and Tesar (1995) showed that IRBC models cannot match the volatility of the HP-…ltered terms of trade, while, in a more recent contribution, Heath-cote and Perri (2002) have pointed out the standard IRBC model’s inability to explain the volatility and persistence of the HP-…ltered RER.

In this paper, we …rst argue that analyzing only the BC ‡uctuations of the RER leads researchers to miss a large part of the story. The reason is as follows. The top panel of Figure 1 plots the (log) U.S. dollar RER along with its implied HP-…ltered “trend” using a bandwidth of 1600. Just from eyeballing, it is evident that most of the ‡uctuations in the U.S. dollar RER have been low-frequency movements. This observation is con…rmed by the spectral analysis that we perform in Section II: most of the variation of the RER in the data is at frequencies lower than BC ‡uctuations (it is 70 percent for the U.S. dollar, and between 60 to 75 percent depending on the currency we examine). These low-frequency movements are removed by HP-…ltering.

Second, motivated by the argument above, we propose to analyze the ‡uctuations of the RER at all frequencies instead. Therefore, we need to consider a model able to generate low-frequency ‡uctuations in the RER. Our baseline model is an extension of the two country, two-good model of Heathcote and Perri (2002) in which stochastic processes for total factor productivity (TFP) are non-stationary but cointegrated across countries. We show that the model can explain about 80 percent of the standard deviation of the RER in the data while closely matching the volatility of output growth when we use a benchmark calibration of the model, including a value of 0:85
for the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs in the production of the …nal good. However, in the model, the RER is too persistent and the spectrum places too much weight on low-frequency ‡uctuations (in the model 85 percent of the variance is caused by low-frequency ‡uctuations while it is 70 percent in the data). In order to solve this shortcoming, we extend the model with adjustment costs in the use of intermediate imported inputs for the production of the …nal good (see Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust, 2006). The presence of these costs allows us to combine a low short-run elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic intermediate goods, which is needed to increase the volatility of the RER at BC frequencies, with a higher long-run elasticity, which is needed to reduce the excessive volatility of the RER at low frequencies.

We show how these input adjustment costs, together with portfolio adjustment costs,help to solve the puzzle by increasing the impact response of the RER in the short run while reducing it at long-run horizons in the model.

The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the spectral analysis of the U.S. dollar RER as well as that of other main currencies. Section III discusses the related literature, while Section IV presents a baseline IRBC model. Section V presents the calibration and the results of the baseline model. In Section VI, we present the extensions to the model and show how they help reconcile theory and evidence. Section VII concludes.

IMF.Author/Editor: Rabanal,Pau;Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F.Series: Working Paper No. 12/13


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Tuesday, January 3, 2012

Uruguay 2011 Article IV Consultation IMF


The strong growth has continued into 2011, but a slowdown is underway  supported by prudent macroeconomic policies. Still, the labor market is tight, wages are rising rapidly, and inflation remains above target. 

The highly uncertain international outlook presents substantial downside  risks. Uruguay’s economic and financial vulnerabilities are modest, and the government  has reduced debt vulnerabilities significantly and built important financial buffers; still the spillovers of a deteriorating global outlook could be significant.  

The immediate challenge is to support an orderly moderation in growth and inflation while reinforcing the economy’s resilience to spillovers from abroad. Staff agrees with the authorities on the key aspects of their macroeconomic framework. 

Maintaining the flexible exchange rate as a shock absorber is crucial. The broadly neutral fiscal stance in 2011 and also planned for 2012 is appropriate. Monetary policy has rightly been on pause since September until the outlook becomes clearer. If the economy takes a turn for the worse, monetary policy could be relaxed provided inflation expectations become reasonably anchored, while fiscal automatic stabilizers should be allowed to operate so long as prudent debt dynamics are maintained. While it would be important to accommodate a real exchange rate depreciation, if needed, part of the ample reserves could be used to contain overshooting. 

A long-term challenge is to sustain high growth with less volatility than in the past, which will require tackling infrastructure gaps, raising labor  skills, and increasing further the economy’s resilience to shocks. 

International Monetary Fund. Published: December 29, 2011


For more information about Projects in Uruguay see SOUTHERN CONE Projects

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Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Honduras.Fiscal Emergency Recovery Development Policy Credit Program

One of the Honduran administration’s top objectives is to foster high economic growth. Putting the economy on a rapid and sustainable growth path will not be easy, but it is feasible. Action will be required on five fronts. First and foremost, a more conducive macroeconomic framework is necessary; in particular, redressing the large imbalances in Central Government finances and unresolved structural weaknesses in public pension funds and public sector enterprises. Second, an integrated citizen security strategy is necessary to tackle the increasing levels of crime and violence that are undermining the country’s growth potential and investment climate. Third, investments in infrastructures are needed to promote the country’s regional development. Fourth, poor governance negatively affects return rates of investment opportunities in Honduras. Finally, low levels of human capital are an important growth constraint. This operation will focus on addressing the first two areas; the rest are being supported by other Bank operations and activities.

2. The Government launched fiscal consolidation efforts in 2010 and has begun tackling the remaining risks to macroeconomic stability and unresolved structural weaknesses in public pension funds and public sector enterprises. To this end, the Government has already introduced measures to close the actuarial deficits of the main public pension institutes—Instituto Nacional de Previsión del Magisterio (INPREMA), which serves the private sector and public sector teachers, and Instituto Nacional de Jubilación y Pensiones de los Empleados Públicos (INJUPEMP), which covers Central Government civil servants.
Similarly, the Government has introduced measures to contain the wage bill and is implementing a strategy to strengthen tax administration.

3. President Lobo’s administration has begun to make significant efforts to fight crime and violence and promote citizen security; however, these efforts will require substantial implementation support in order to be sustained and to have a robust development impact over time. The Government has approved the National Citizen Security and Co-existence Policy 2011-2022, which provides a comprehensive and long-term approach to this challenge, with crime prevention as one of its main pillars. In addition, the Government has mandated the Security, Defense, and Governance Cabinet (Gabinete de Seguridad, Defensa y Gobernabilidad) to provide the intra-governmental coordination which is required to implement the policy. Moreover, Congress has approved legal reforms to secure new resources to finance activities to foster security, including those addressed in the citizen security policy framework.

4. This document describes a proposed First Programmatic Reducing Vulnerabilities For Growth Development Policy Credit (DPC) in the amount of SDR 55.1 million for the Republic of Honduras. The programmatic series, which includes one subsequent loan, is designed to assist the Government in strengthening fiscal management and in implementing an integrated citizen security policy. Specifically, the operation supports four areas that are central to the reform program: (i) tax administration, focused on improving taxpayer compliance; (ii) civil service reform, focused on the rationalization of the public
wage bill by delinking teachers’ salary adjustments from those reflected in the private sector’s minimum wage; (iii) pension reform, designed to lessen contingent fiscal vulnerabilities by reducing the public pension institutions’ actuarial deficits, and (iv) citizen security reform, focused on strengthening institutional coordination mechanisms and programs needed for an integrated violence prevention strategy . The reforms supported by this operation are expected to have a positive impact on poverty and inequality (see section VI).

5. The proposed operation is envisaged in the new Country Partnership Strategy covering the period FY2012-2014 (to be presented jointly with this operation to the Board of Executive Directors) and is closely aligned with other Bank operations. For example, the Improving Public Sector Performance Technical Assistance Loan (P110050, currently under preparation and expected to accompany this operation) provides support to strengthen public sector human resource management. In addition, a Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) for Employment Generation in Poor Urban Neighborhoods will complement this operation.

World Bank. Document Date:  2011/11/03.Document Type:  Program Document.Report Number:55656.Volume No: 1 of 1

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Monday, December 5, 2011

Marocco.IFM Report 2011

Several years of sound macroeconomic policies and political reforms left Morocco well-equipped to address the 2008 international crisis and to respond to pressing social demands. In this challenging environment, Morocco has performed well economically and has seen its social indicators improve.

Growth prospects: Despite the slow recovery in the Euro zone—Morocco’s main trading partner—overall GDP is expected to grow between 4½–5 percent owing to good agricultural production and the strong performance of the nonagricultural sector, particularly services and domestic consumption. Unemployment is about 9 percent, but urban and youth unemployment remains high. The major medium-term challenge is to achieve high real GDP growth rates to reduce unemployment and improve living standards. Slow growth in Europe could affect economic activity and worsen prospects.

Resuming fiscal consolidation: Prudent policies in previous years provided a financial margin to deal with the international crisis and its aftermath. In 2011, the authorities addressed social demands by increasing public sector wages and keeping fuel and certain food prices stable through large subsidies. While there is fiscal space in the short run for spending to support the political reform process and ensure social cohesion, starting in 2012 Morocco would need to adopt significant fiscal measures, particularly reforming the generalized subsidies scheme, to ensure medium-term sustainability. While implementing the subsidy reform will be politically difficult, the government is committed to improving the targeting of subsidies, reducing their cost to 3 percent of GDP, and reducing public wages to 10 percent of GDP over the medium term.

Continuing financial sector development: The financial sector has reached a significant size, but further domestic resource mobilization is needed to support credit growth. With the budget financed domestically, there may be some risk of crowding out. The authorities have taken significant measures to encourage higher financial intermediation, savings, and new financial products. The funding of Moroccan banks, which includes funding for foreign subsidiaries, mainly relies on Moroccan deposits in Dirhams, which would help to mitigate risks associated with tighter liquidity in the Euro money market.

Improving productivity: Deepening structural reforms is essential to sustaining Morocco’s productivity. The government has launched reforms to improve the business environment and social indicators to boost potential growth while reducing unemployment.

Morocco: 2011 Article IV Consultation. Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director.
December 02, 2011. Country Report No. 11/341

Marocco.IFM Report 2011.

Friday, November 18, 2011

Honduras.Support Programe for Reform of Pension Institutions and the HHRR Management System

The general objective of the program is to help the country macroeconomic and fiscal stability take root through reforms that promote the long-term sustainability of pension institutions and control over unplanned growth of government employee salaries.

The specific objectives are to support efforts by the Government of Honduras to reform its pension institutions and to introduce improvements in systems for administrative and budgetary control over the central governments human resources so as to lay the groundwork for building a more equitable and sustainable pension system and for improving human resources management in the central government.

The program will be structured in three components: (i) macroeconomic stability; (ii) pension institution reform; and (iii) improvement in management of the central government human resources.

IDB, Honduras. HO-L1079 : Support Prog. for Reform of Pension Institutions and the HHRR Management System

Honduras.Strengthen the Financial Security Network and Improve Access to Financing

The program has three components: (i) macroeconomic stability; (ii) srengthening of the financialsafety net (FSN) through: (a) strengthening prudential regulation and supervision, (b) strengthening the other basic institutional elements of the FSN; (iii) improving access to financing, with the following subcomponents:

(a) promoting transparency of information and protection for financial service customers;

(b) improving the regulatory framework and the process for enforcing secured transactions; and

(c) institutional strengthening of the savings & loan cooperatives.

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

Can Emerging Market Central Banks Bail Out Banks? A Cautionary Tale from Latin America

This paper investigates whether developing and emerging market countries can implement monetary policies similar to those used by advanced countries during the recent global crisis - injecting significant amounts of money into the financial system without facing major short-run adverse macroeconomic repercussions. Using panel data techniques, the paper analyzes episodes of financial turmoil in 16 Latin America during 1995-2007.
The results show that developing and emerging market countries should be cautious because injecting money on a large scale into the financial system may fuel further macroeconomic instability, increasing the chances of simultaneous currency crises.
 
IMF. Author/Editor: Jácome, Luis Ignacio ; Saadi Sedik, Tahsin ; Townsend, Simon.Authorized for Distribution: November 01, 2011.Series:Working Paper No. 11/258
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Wednesday, November 9, 2011

World Bank.Bolivia.Country partnership strategy progress report for FY2012-FY2015

Bolivia has undergone a period of profound change since the Government of President Morales came to power in January 2006. The Morales administration has implemented an array of economic and social policies to empower indigenous peoples and reduce poverty and inequality.

Macroeconomic results have been positive, with regular fiscal and current account balances for the first time in decades, declining public debt and steady 4.5 percent annual growth rates over the past seven years. In the nearly six years since Mr. Evo Morales was elected as Bolivia's first indigenous president, the country has experienced significant socio-political and economic change.

Driven by high commodity prices and prudent fiscal and monetary policies, Bolivia's economy has had an annual average growth of 4.5 percent for the past seven years, increasing per capita income by 18 percent. Current account surpluses have prevailed since 2003, and the fiscal balance turned positive in 2006 for the first time in decades. Thanks to this positive macroeconomic performance and debt relief, gross public debt dropped from 96 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003 to 40 percent in 2010 while international reserves increased from less than $1 billion to nearly $10 billion over the same time span. Despite progress, Bolivia faces major development challenges.

It has one of the lowest GDP per capita levels in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, moderate poverty afflicts more than half of the population and income inequality is still very high. Recent economic growth is vulnerable to shifts in international commodity prices and total investment is low, limiting economic expansion. This four-year World Bank Group (WBG) Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), agreed upon with the Government, proposes a viable medium-term program for addressing some of Bolivia's challenges.

During the consolidation of the reform process initiated by the election of the Government of President Morales, the World Bank Group (WBG) has operated through two consecutive Interim Strategy Notes (ISNs), following the recommendation from the 2005 country assistance evaluation to use shorter-term strategies in the face of high uncertainty.

Now that the conditions for the implementation of a CPS are in place a new constitutional framework, consolidated policy environment, sound macroeconomic situation, good dialogue between the WBG and authorities and improved implementation capacity and the Government has requested Bank support through a medium-term strategy.

Document Date:2011/11/01. Country Assistance Strategy Document.Report Number: 65108. Volume No: 1 of 1. Country:Bolivia.Disclosure Date: 2011/11/09

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