This paper studies a transmission mechanism through which pro-vulnerable income
transfers may affect individual decision-making of non-beneficiaries in an
extreme poverty context, leading to labor supply contraction and the so-called
dependency syndrome. The argument is based on the distributional distortion this
transfer may provoke to the relative quality of leisure, enjoyed by the
population in an extreme poverty scenario.
Assuming the existence of vulnerable
individuals and different income groups based on certain physical, economic, or
social characteristics, the author studies their decision processes and, in
particular, their reactions to the aid program. The results of this theoretical
research provide some insights on the conditions that an optimal pro-poor income
transfer should present. A literature review is presented in support of the
arguments made in the theoretical part
World Bank. Author: Limodio, Nicola.Document Date: 2011/11/01.Document Type: Policy Research Working Paper.Report Number: WPS5881.Volume No: 1 of 1
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