Most emerging markets do not borrow much internationally in their own currency,
although doing that has been argued as an attractive insurance mechanism. This
phenomenon, commonly labeled "the original sin", has mostly been interpreted as
evidence of the countries' inability to borrow in domestic currency from abroad.
This paper provides a novel explanation for that phenomenon: not that countries
are unable to borrow abroad in their currency, they might not need to do so. In
the model, the small prevalence of external borrowing in domestic currency
arises as an equilibrium outcome, despite the absence of exogenous frictions or
limits on market participation. The equilibrium outcome is driven by the fact
that domestic and foreign lenders have differential consumption baskets.
In
particular, a large part of domestic lenders' consumption basket is denominated
in domestic currency whereas all of foreign lenders' is in dollars. A
depreciation of domestic currency, which tends to occur in bad times, is
therefore less harmful to domestic savers than to foreign investors.
This makes
domestic lenders require a lower premium than foreign lenders on domestic
currency debt. For plausible calibrations, this consumption basket effect can
induce foreign investors to pull out of the domestic currency debt market.
Author: | Bengui, Julien ; Nguyen, Ha ; |
Document Date: | 2011/11/01 |
Document Type: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Report Number: | WPS5870 |
Volume No: | 1 of 1 |
32 pages | Official Version | [2.24 mb] | |
Text | Text Version* |
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